Good mine, bad mine: Natural resource heterogeneity and Dutch disease in Indonesia

(Journal of International Economics, Volume 131, 2021. Joint with Steven Poelhekke) CEPR DP15271 TI DP 18073 OxCarre RP 214 CESifo WP 7284

Abstract: We analyse the local effect of exogenous shocks to the value of mineral deposits at the district level in Indonesia using a panel of manufacturing plants. We introduce heterogeneity in natural resource extraction methods, which helps to explain the mixed evidence found in the `Dutch disease’ literature. In areas where mineral extraction is relatively capital-intensive, mining booms cause virtually no upward pressure on manufacturing wages, and both producers of traded and local goods benefit from mining booms in terms of employment. In contrast, labor-intensive mining booms drive up local manufacturing wages such that traded-goods producers reduce employment.


Capital Regulations and the Management of Credit Commitments during Crisis Times

(joint with María Teresa Valderrama; Revise & Resubmit at Review of Finance) NHH DP FOR12/2020DNB WP No.661

Abstract: Drawdowns on credit commitments by firms reduce a bank’s regulatory capital ratio. Using the Austrian Credit Register, we provide novel evidence that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, capital-constrained banks managed this concern by substantially cutting partly or fully unused credit commitments. Controlling for a bank’s capital position, we also find that greater liquidity problems induced banks to considerably cut such credit commitments during the crisis. These results suggest that banks actively manage both capital and liquidity risk caused by undrawn credit commitments in periods of financial distress, but thereby reduce liquidity provision to firms exactly when they need it most.

Electing Educated Leaders during Democratization: Evidence from Indonesia

(joint with Steven Poelhekke; Under review) CEPR DP16486; VoxDev

Abstract: Using manufacturing plant-level census data from Indonesia, we show that the effect of democratization on manufacturing performance crucially depends on the education level of the newly elected local leaders. In districts that elect a mayor without college education, employment drops by five percent in the first few years after democratization, while employment stays constant under college-educated mayors. We also identify mechanisms: manufacturing plants in districts with non-college educated mayors face a much larger increase in local taxes, but also worse provision of local infrastructure and no extra spending on other public goods. A novel hand-collected dataset on corruption cases further suggests that democratic mayors without a college degree are more corrupt. Our estimates are plausibly causal since the year of local democratization varies exogenously across districts, and districts with different mayor education levels exhibit parallel trends in manufacturing prior to democratization.


Politics and Financial Intermediation: Evidence from Brazil (joint with Matias Ossandon Busch)